Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
内蒙古自治区乌海市人民政府办公厅


乌海市人民政府办公厅关于印发《乌海市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度工作方案》的通知


各区人民政府，市府各部门，各驻市单位，各企事业单位：
根据自治区人民政府关于贯彻《中华人民共和国行政许可法》(内政发〔2003〕97号)通知精神，按照自治区贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度工作领导小组的统一部署，经市政府2004年第二次常务会议研究同意，现将《乌海市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度工作方案》(以下简称《方案》)印发给你们，请认真按照《方案》中的要求，做好本地区、本部门、本单位的工作，工作中的有关事宜由市政府法制办具体负责。
二○○四年三月二十四日
乌海市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度工作方案
一、指导思想
以党的十六届三中全会精神和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，认真贯彻落实行政许可法，深化行政审批制度改革，加快政府职能转变，创新政府管理方式，提高政府工作效率和服务水平，形成行为规范、运转协调、公正透明、廉洁高效的行政管理体制，促进社会经济全面协调发展。
二、工作原则
（一）加强领导，分级负责。
要将贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革列入重要日程，实行主要领导负责制，按照分级负责的原则，做好本地区、本部门、本单位的各项工作。
（二）依法清理，保证质量。
严格按照行政许可法的规定进行各项清理工作。对不符合行政许可法规定的，坚决予以改正、修改、取消或废止，做到不打折扣，不留死角。
（三）强化培训，扩大宣传。
加强对清理工作人员、行政执法人员和具体办理行政许可事项人员的培训。通过新闻媒体等多种方式广泛宣传，为贯彻实施行政许可法和推进行政审批制度改革营造良好的社会氛围。
（四）统筹部署，限期完成。
采取切实可行的措施，统筹安排，周密部署，加强督促指导，保证本地区、本部门、本单位的各项工作扎实、有序、按时完成。
三 、组织机构
根据工作需要和人事变动情况，决定将行政审批制度改革工作领导小组更名为乌海市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组（以下简称为领导小组），并对部分组成人员进行调整。
组 长：薄连根 市委常委、市政府常务副市长
副组长：周宏伟 市政府秘书长、办公厅主任
王肆虎 市政府副秘书长
聂瑞声 市监察局局长
成 员：李尚智 市政府办公厅纪检组长
吴宝卿 市监察局副局长
王志成 市编办副主任
陈文库 市发改委副主任、西部大开发办公室主任
杨茂林 市经委副主任
布 和 市财政局副局长
郅建民 市民政局局长
李树林 市商务局副局长
杨 林 市工商局局长
崔 浩 市监察局综合室主任
乔晓梅 市政府法制办主任
闫景昕 市政府调研室副主任
领导小组办公室设在市政府办公厅，办公室主任由李尚智兼任，副主任由吴宝卿、崔浩、乔晓梅担任。
四、宣传、培训工作
（一）宣传工作：市政府办公厅与市委宣传部共同协调乌海日报社、乌海电视台等新闻媒体,宣传行政许可法相关知识;开辟学习、宣传行政许可法专栏，刊载有关的专题文章、讲话等;按照自治区关于行政许可法宣传工作要求，开展相应的工作。
（二）培训工作：1、在市政府全体会议上，市政府主要领导对全市学习贯彻《行政许可法》，推进行政审批制度改革工作，提出具体、明确的要求。2、举办行政许可法讲座，时间半天，观看国务院法制办副主任汪永清的专题讲座录像，由市政府法制办负责人讲解文件清理工作注意事项。参加人员：市政府和办公厅领导及全体工作人员，各区政府分管副区长和法制机构工作人员，各单位负责人及有关工作人员。
五、清理工作
（一）清理原则。
1、统一组织和分级、分工负责相结合的原则。按照自治区政府的统一部署和要求，清理工作由市、区两级分别组织实施，市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组负责组织市本级和市属及驻市单位的清理工作；各区人民政府负责本地区的清理工作。
2、全面清理的原则。凡属各单位正在实施的行政许可事项及其文件载体都要进行清理。对地方性法规、政府规章、各级政府及其所属部门的文件涉及的行政许可事项，只要涉及到本部门的职责都要逐件进行清理。在清理行政许可事项时，连同事项的实施主体、条件、程序和期限、收费等一并进行清理。
3、依法审定原则。清理工作要严格依照行政许可法规定的权限、范围和标准进行，对不符合行政许可法规定的，要依法予以修改或废止，各单位在清理中要提出修改或废止的相关建议。
（二）工作机构
根据工作需要，在市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组的领导下，成立清理工作小组。
组 长：李尚智
成 员：多金城 崔 浩 乔晓梅 潭 红
电 话：2999617
（三）清理工作的具体分工和任务。
清理工作小组负责组织市属及驻市单位的清理工作；指导各区人民政府的清理工作；对各区人民政府及各单位的清理情况进行审查认定；汇总全市清理工作结果，
经市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组审核后，上报自治区贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组。
各区人民政府和各单位负责涉及本单位实施的文件中设定的行政许可事项的清理工作，文件包括地方性法规、自治区政府规章、自治区政府及办公厅文件、市政府及办公厅的文件、各区人民政府及办公室文件、市政府各委、办、局的文件。清理的内容包括行政许可事项、实施主体、条件、程序和期限、收费等五个方面的内容。各区人民政府和各单位在报送清理情况表格时，要按照下列标准提出初步处理意见：
1、如果设定行政许可的依据文件是法律、行政法规或者国务院决定，且没有作出修改，依法予以保留。
2、如果设定行政许可的依据是除法律、行政法规或者国务院决定以外的国务院其他文件、国务院部门规章、国务院部委文件，各单位要按要求对该行政许可的事项、实施主体、条件和期限、收费等清理出来并提出处理意见。
3、地方性法规、自治区政府规章设定的行政许可事项，如果符合行政许可法第十二条和第十五条第一款规定的依法予以保留。
4、地方性法规、自治区政府规章设定的行政许可事项不属于行政许可法第十二条规定的情形；或者属于第十二条规定的情形，但是能够通过第十三条规定予以规范；或者属于第十五条第二款规定的情形，原则上应予以取消。
5、自治区政府规章以下各类文件设定的行政许可事项应予以取消。如果自治区政府文件确需保留行政许可的，可以提出立法建议。
6、凡不符合行政许可法规定的行政许可实施主体必须予以调整。
7、如果地方性法规、自治区政府规章、自治区政府及办公厅文件、自治区各厅局、市政府及办公厅的文件在对行政许可条件作出的具体规定中增设了违反上位法的其他条件，各单位在清理中提出修改建议；对增设违反上位法的其他规范性文件，制定单位应当予以修改或者废止。
8、行政许可程序和期限不符合行政许可法和上位法的规定，属于地方性法规、自治区政府规章、自治区政府、自治区各厅局或者市政府及办公厅文件的，应当提出修改或者废止的建议，属于其他规范性文件的，各制定单位应当予以修改或者废止。
9、行政许可收费没有法律、行政法规作依据的，一律不得收费。对没有法律、行政法规依据，地方性法规、自治区政府规章或者其他规范性文件规定收费的，要提出修改或者废止建议。
10、对行政许可事项、实施主体、条件、程序和期限、收费等内容的清理建议，涉及地方性法规、自治区政府规章、市政府规范性文件立、改、废的，要同时提出建议。
（四）清理工作步骤。
第一阶段，自2004年3月24日至4月10日为全面清理阶段。各区人民政府和各单位对涉及本单位的行政许可事项的文件进行全面清理，并按照要求认真填写《乌海市行政许可事项清理表》和《乌海市行政许可事项清理汇总表》，于2004年4月10日前报送市政府法制办公室。
第二阶段，自2004年4月11日至4月23日为依法审查认定阶段。对各区人民政府和各单位报送的《乌海市行政许可事项清理表》和《乌海市行政许可事项清理汇总表》逐项进行审查，提出初步审查意见并征求有关部门的意见后，形成认定处理意见；对个别事项的设定机关不符合行政许可法规定但确需保留的，报自治区贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组办公室决定。
第三阶段，自2004年4月24日至5月10日，为依法规范和公布阶段。根据清理结果，对保留的行政许可事项、实施主体、条件、程序和期限、收费等与行政许可法及相关的法律、法规规定不符的内容，依法予以规范和调整。涉及需要修改或者废止的规范性文件和市政府及办公厅文件的，由市贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组负责组织落实。5月10日前将全市的清理结果上报自治区贯彻实施行政许可法和行政审批制度改革工作领导小组办公室审查，审查通过后，于6月底前公布行政许可事项和实施主体名录。7月1日起，凡与行政许可法不一致的有关行政许可规定或者未经公布的有关许可，一律停止执行。
（五）清理工作要求。
各区人民政府、各部门、各单位要加强领导、提高认识、认真学习贯彻行政许可法，熟练掌握清理工作标准，有组织、有步骤地开展工作。这次清理工作任务重、范围广、事项多、时间紧，相关单位要以高度的责任心，严谨的工作态度，认真对待这项工作。要建立清理工作责任制，集中时间和人力，全力以赴，按时、保质保量完成清理任务。

乌海市人民政府办公厅
2004年3月24日印发